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GAULT AND THE JUVENILE TRAINING SCHOOL
Amos E. REEDt
As is usual with legal and social developments, there has been a very
mixed reaction to In re Gault.' Some feel that Gault rings the death knell
for the juvenile court and for training schools. The other extreme is
elation over a decision that, they feel, was long over-due and is very
commendable. The majority of training school superintendents are quite
cautious about passing judgment in a hasty or premature manner. It
would, they believe, be fallacious to attribute to Gault all the changes in
the courts and training schools that have occurred since the decision was
handed down on May 15, 1967. Since the careers of superintendents
have been invested in supporting and improving the juvenile court
process, it should be apparent that, although Gault presents a major
challenge to administrators and their staffs, they will continue to fight to
preserve the best interests of children.
Juvenile training schools are symbiotically joined to the juvenile
court system, which originated in Illinois in 1899; Illinois saw the need
for a training school resource and established its State Training School
for Boys in 1903. There has continued to be interdependence between
juvenile courts and training schools. As has been so frequently stated,
serious concern was expressed that children were being given legal
treatment as if they were fully responsible adults. Although driven by
the impulsion and compulsion of youth and unable to understand legal
procedures or to defend themselves in the legal actions brought against
them, boys and girls were sadistically punished by private and public
floggings, deprived of food, lodged in dungeons and cells along with
adults, forced to do cruelly hard labor, and otherwise abused and neglected.
Little or no effort was made to consider individual differences or
special needs since justice was blind to these humanitarian aspects-the
criminal code was followed rigidly. Trials, such as they were, usually
resulted in a staged scene where non-lawyers and non-professionals
ruled by prejudice and whim. Jerome E. Bates points out that, "[t]he
interest of society in the reasons for anti-social behavior is of recent
origin. Formerly society was mainly concerned with the apprehension
and punishment of the criminal. Interest has now shifted from the fact of
the crime to the motivations behind criminal acts." 2 Specialized court
tPresident, National Association of Training Schools and Juvenile Agencies.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Bates, Abrahanzsen's Theory of the Etiology of Criminal Acts, 40 J. CRin.
L. C. & P.L. 471 (1949).
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services and specialized treatment resources, including training schools,
have given special recognition to children.
Lawyers and social workers joined efforts to improve services to
children and to give greater protection to family life by developing laws,
courts, institutions, and services to meet the special needs of children;
emphasis was placed upon the authorities' playing parental roles as
opposed to their former roles of vengeful punishers. The original Illinois
juvenile court act of 1899 states,
[t]his act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose
may be carried out, to wit: That the care, custody and discipline
of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which
should be given by its parents, and in all cases where it can
properly be done the child be placed in an approved family
home and become a member of the family by legal adoption or
otherwise.'
Nevertheless, the new design was implemented by the old practitioners
who were limited by the ignorance, fear, and misbeliefs of the past.
In varying degrees, this situation has existed to the present date.
Mr. Justice Fortas, in the Court's opinion, points out that, "[j]uvenile
court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure." 4 The dream and the reality have been far apart. Yet the same
can be said of criminal courts, recently described by Dean Barrett, who
said, "[s]uddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the
criminal process, there is scant regard for them as individuals. They are
numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their way.
The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous."5 It is this
reality that those who work with children have resisted for over a half
century. Gault raises this spectre in the minds of many of us who fully
support due process but fear the "reality" for children.
Universities and law schools, I feel, have failed miserably in com-
municating juvenile court and training school concepts to student law-
yers. Consequently, very few lawyers have training relevant to the
juvenile court process. Children in trouble most frequently have lacked
the funds, friends, and understanding that would attract and encourage
legal counsel. When counsel has been obtained, he has generally been an
untrained and uninformed lawyer who proceeds as if he were in criminal
3. Juvenile Court Act of Apr. 21, 1899, § 21, [1899] Ill. Laws 137.
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
5. PRESIDENT'S ComM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMNISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHA-LIENGE OF CRIME IN A Fm SoCia y 128 (1967).
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court. And in most instances, little or no attention has been given to the
emotional, cultural, mental, and social strengths and weaknesses of the
child clients. When the above conditions are coupled with inadequate
agency staff, funds, facilities, and other resources, the result, far too
frequently, has been to turn a noble dream into a shoddy nightmare.
Some extremists among professoinals of the permissvie school of thought,
who would attribute all misbehavior to mental illness, have further con-
tributed to a system neglectful of the rights and interests of both the
children and the community.
Against these great odds, judges, administrators, and experienced
staffs have achieved the near-impossible in bringing improvements to
programs designed to provide suitable care and direction for children with
exceptional needs. Yet high interest and motivation on the part of present-
day lawyers and professionals in the behavioral sciences might have
combined to more quickly reduce, if not eliminate, the dichotomy between
law and social treatment. Dean Griswold delineated the high principles of
this concept in 1951 when he said, "[i]n the second half of our century
we are perhaps embarking on an era of investigation and research in
which legislation and judicial reasoning will be based more and more on
the study of the patterns of behavior and motivation that emerge from
careful field investigations of the labors, agreements, and conflicts of men
in the factory, the market-place, and the home."6 Had more states and
more courts carefully observed due process while individualizing concern
for children, the Gault decision would not have been required.
We must, of course, be careful not to return children to fully equal
status with adults as was the case before the juvenile court was estab-
lished. They were then given equal "treatment" in the jails, asylums and
penitentiaries. For decades, juveniles have received preferential treat-
ment more commensurate with their youth and immaturity. Many daring
departures from old penal concepts have resulted in the generous usage of
probation, parole, temporary detention, foster care, group homes, work
release, authorized absences, special schooling, medical and psychiatric
care, and a host of other social services and innovations designed to
improve the child and keep him in continuing contact with his community.
Much of the recent progressive planning in adult penal settings is directly
derived from programs proven to be helpful in working with juveniles.
The juvenile court has also been inspirational to those providing treat-
ment and care for the mentally ill and mentally retarded, and our society
has been enriched and improved as a consequence.
6. S. GLuECK & E. GLuECK, UNRAVELLING JuvENILE DELiNQ ENCY (forward by
E. Griswold 1951).
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It is somewhat unfortunate that the Gault decision came at the very
time that attention was being focused upon procedure in dealing with
children. It must be emphasized that the states had been setting their
legal houses in order in reference to juvenile court procedure. New
York's Superintendent Hill reports that New York's Family Court Act
of 1962' provided the safeguards now required by the Gault decision,
and much concern is shown for the procedural rights of those who
appear in the Family Court. The 1962 Act carefully provides for
"adjudicatory hearings" and "dispositional hearings," preponderance of
evidence, competency and relevancy of evidence, right to counsel, right
to a law guardian provided at public expense, advice of the right to remain
silent given "at the commencement of the hearing," time limitations on
placements and commitments, notification of parents, and other elements
closely paralleling the requirements set forth in Gault. This framework
of procedural fairness along with safeguards against abuse has so revamp-
ed New York's juvenile system that Gault has had no direct impact.8
From another state, Superintendent Sublett reports that
Illinois anticipated the Gault decision with its new Juvenile
Court law that went into effect August 5, 1965. The new law
represented the first meaningful change in the Juvenile Court
Act in Illinois since the original prototype of 1899. In anticipa-
tion of the State's Juvenile Act of 1965, the Court of Cook
County instituted most of the recommended procedures as early
as 1963. Cook County processes the majority of the delinquents
in the State of Illinois. The procedures established in the Cook
County Court and validated by the Juvenile Court Act of 1965
gave to the juvenile the protection implied in the Gault decision
relative to due process, adjudicatory procedures, disposition of
cases, and legal representation.9
Oregon's Juvenile Court Act of 1959° continues to stand the test of
time. It was modeled after the 1954 Children's Bureau Standards for
Juveniles and Family Courts as sponsored by the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, the National Association of Juvenile Court
Judges, and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and
it provides virtually all of the safeguards delineated in Gault. Thus, there
7. N.Y. FAmNIY CT. AcT §§ 111-1019 (Mclinney 1963). There has been a
decrease in commitments which the New York superintendents of training schools
feel is only temporary.
8. Letter from Benjamin J. Hill, Superintendent, Otisville State Training School
Boys, St. Charles, Ill., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 11, 1967.
9. Letter from Sam Sublett, Jr., Superintendent, Illinois State Training School for
Boys, Eldora, Iowa, to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 5, 1967.
10. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.472-419.990 (Repl. 1967).
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has been no noticeable impact on Oregon's training schools since the
Gault decision, and no writs of habeas corpus have been filed. Intake at
the MacLaren School for Boys shows 493 for 1967 as against 499 for
1966 (an alltime high). The Hillcrest School for Girls showed an intake
of 153 for 1967-an increase of 21 over 1966.
It is clear that states such as New York, Illinois, and Oregon have
wisely provided due process without losing the benefits of individualiza-
tion of care. As Dr. Paul Tappan reports, "[t]he full rigors of the
criminal law are mitigated by reason of the offender's youth, but the
judicial view would preserve in the hearings of children's courts a real
test of the individual's status as a delinquent before applying to him the
modern and individualized methods of treatment."1 It would appear
that this viewpoint would not be in opposition to treatment methods but
would defer individualized methods until after a finding of delinquency.
Superintendent Tunney of New York has witnessed little or no
effect from Gazdt. Although one may not totally agree with Superinten-
dent Tunney, the merit of his evaluation must still be acknowledged:
[i]t occurs to me that in view of the historical evolution of the
Juvenile Court System, along with the development of a more
complex society, such a decision as that of Gault was sooner
or later bound to happen. Nor can I say that I am particularly
unhappy about it, and it would seem that we are at last coming
to grips with the fact that the doctrine on which the system
was built has never really proved out. The emphasis of reform-
ing the individual child by having a conglomeration of services
available has at last given way to focusing our attention on
changing society through economic and social means as a
chief weapon in the fight against delinquency. The aspirations
of what could be accomplished for the individual offender have
failed miserably under goals. Staff have not been available in
numbers that would afford meaningful supervision, the courts
have not been provided with the resources the Juvenile Court
theory required, and the informality of the proceeding has
allowed for considerable miscarriage of justice without the
promised rehabilitative effects. Along with tightening up the
protection aspects of the criminal juvenile proceeding, we
should see a renewed effort to keep juveniles out of the Court
System. In short, the idea of reforming the individual through
institutionalization has not been realized and the new emphasis
11. P. TAPPAN, PHILOSOPHY OF THE JUVENILE COURT, THE HANDLING OF JUVEN-
ILES FROIM OFFENSE TO DISPOSITION 285 ( ).
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should be attacking the social evilg, but providing complete
protection for those who do find themselves in the court."
Superintendent Huckabee of South Carolina believes that Gault ".
destroys completely the concept of the juvenile courts as friends of the
child with the capacity to act in loco parentis for the best interest of the
child.""8 A correspondent in Connecticut felt that her state had provided
legal safeguards for children and consequently the Gault decision was a
long step backward. Superintendent Travisano of Iowa expressed the
opinion that he really can't see how Gault has affected Iowa. He does
wonder, ". . if we are going to become all legal and/or criminal it
might tend to reduce the use of alternatives a judge feels he has at his
disposal."' 4 Wisconsin's Dr. Prast agrees ". . that juveniles should
have the same rights afforded adults" but is reminded that ". . . in the
case of adults, sometimes justice is very slow, and if these kids are going
to spend months in limbo, so to speak, [he does] not think they will
receive the help they need within reasonable time limits." 5 Dr. Prast
was also somewhat concerned about lawyer's fees when the parents are
unwilling or unable to pay them.
Throughout the nation, the number of court hearings involving
training school staff is increasing and staff are expected to prove their
allegations within a legal framework. Since the staff are more treatment
than law oriented, there is a feeling that legal representation might, by
necessity, become a component part of the institutional staffing pattern.
In one recent New York case, Superintendent Costello reports, "[i]t
was necessary for the institution staff to appear in court and be cross-
examined by the attorney of a family that was objecting to extension of
placement. In these proceedings only factual material was acceptable.
Actually [the] case record was not admissible as evidence." 6 Some
superintendents are observing that training school children are being
taught not to admit any of their actions and are looking to attorneys to
speak for them.'"
As early as September 3, 1967, twenty-one juveniles already "had
12. Letter from Thomas E. Tunney, Superintendent, Training School for Girls,
Hudson, N.Y., to Amos E. Reed, Nov. 28, 1967.
13. Letter from W. M. Huckakee, Superintendent, South Carolina School for
Boys, Florence, S.C., to Amos E. Reed, Nov. 30, 1967.
14. Letter from Anthony P. Travisano, Superintendent, Iowa Training School for
for Boys, Otisville, N.Y. to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 12, 1962.
15. Letter from Paul A. Prast, Superintendent, Kettle Morraine Boys School,
Plymouth, Wis., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 6,1967.
16. Letter from John B. Costello, Superintendent, State Agric. and Indus. School,
Industry, N.Y., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 1, 1967.
17. Letter from M. B. Kindrick, Superintendent, Gatesville State School for
Boys, Gatesville, Tex., to Amos B. Reed, Dec. 5, 1967.
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been released from the Wisconsin schools for boys at Wales and Ply-
mouth, and the State Reformatory-on writs of habeas corpus.... They
have charged, and the judges have agreed, that they were not represented
by attorneys at the time of their trials and therefore were deprived of their
constitutional rights."'" According to a United Press International
release of August 20, 1967, Attorney Joseph Prezlonik, Director of the
Wisconsin judicare program for legal aid for indigents reported that,
"[a]bout 150 of the juveniles in the Green Bay Reformatory had con-
tacted his office for legal aid and had prepared petitions asking Brown
County to appoint attorneys."' 9 The challenge being given to Wisconsin
involves several thousand children and youths in training schools and
reformatories, on probation and parole, and under the supervision of
the state's Welfare Department. Wisconsin Corrections Division Admin-
istrator Powers, thinks "[i]t would be unfortunate if a couple thousand
[juvenile offenders] were just dumped out on the body politic" since
"there are some pretty dangerous kids among them." 20 A girl at the
Kansas Girls' Industrial School is reported to have been released from
juvenile court wardship because of some legal technicality brought to
light by her mother's attorney. The agency felt that the girl had, and
still does have, serious emotional problems that will eventually lead to a
mental hospital assignment or probably even prison. South Carolina has
had several boys returned to the courts on writs of habeas corpus for
retrial based on Gault. Several were released by the court and two were
returned to the South Carolina School for Boys after trial. Three habeas
corpus writs have been served on Superintendent Morello of the New
Hampshire Industrial School. In some places in Kentucky, juvenile courts
requested that training schools release certain children whose placements
had been challenged. Also, some parents called the training schools and
threatened legal action. In a number of these cases, the youths were
released to avoid forcing the matter to a determination. In about half of
these cases, the children became involved in serious difficulty and were
shortly returned to custody by the juvenile court."
It is of interest to note that several states have experienced reduced
intake;" some reductions were drastic and some minimal. However,
not all of these reductions could be attributed to Gault. Nine of the ten
state operated facilities in Pennsylvania have experienced drastic reduc-
18. Milwaukee Journal, Sept. 3, 1967, at 1.
19. Milwaukee Journal, Aug. 20, 1967, at 13.
20. Milwaukee Journal, Sept. 3, 1967, at 1.
21. Letter from Robert P. McClure, Superintendent, Kentucky Village, Lexington,
Ky., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 29, 1967.
22. See Sheridan, The Gault Decision and Probation Services, 43 IND. L.J.
n.4 (1968).
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toins in admission rates since June, 1967. Commitments at the State
Home for Boys at Jamestown, N.J., in July, August, and September
1966 were 52, 41, and 65 compared with 35, 31, and 12 for the same
months in 1967. Annandale commitments during July, August, and
September 1966 were 70, 49, and 62 respectively compared with 65, 32,
and 14 in 1967. Mr. Albert C. Wagner, New Jersey Director of Cor-
rections and Parole states that, "[t]he effect of the Supreme Court
rulings is seen also at the Residential Group Centers where the waiting
list for boys has stood normally at about twenty was down to five at the
end of October [sic]. Apparently, the courts are not referring for
institutionalization any case where question may be raised with respect
to the due process aspect of the proceedings."23 Intake has also fallen
off in Kentucky, New Mexico, Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Mary-
land. It is interesting to note that Gault has had no appreciable effect on
training schools in Iowa, the District of Columbia, Maine, Arizona,
California, Florida, New York, Illinois and Oregon.
There is mixed feeling about the greater involvement of attorneys
in the juvenile court process. Some superintendents feel that the involve-
ment of attorneys will inevitably lead to the education of these pro-
fessionals whose training has been inadequate and incomplete insofar
as matters pertaining to children are concerned. The lawyers may help
to stabilize the family group, may give a positive image of authority,
and may become a valuable counselor to the family. I can attest that
families may,be influenced by attorneys to function in a more socially
effective manner.
Many side effects of Gault are being noted. Superintendent Walker
of the New Mexico Boys' School reports that, "[t]here is an obvious
increase in Probation Officer time spent on investigation and since
Probation Officers are responsible for both investigations and super-
vision, this results in a decrease in time and services spent in the super-
vision of minors prior to commitment to the Boys' School and after
release."24 In addition, New Mexico reports a significant increase in
returnees and a slowing down of the court process. New York Superin-
tendant Hill advises that,
[w] hile the Gault Decision has made no direct impact, it has, by
virtue of its being a part of the increased concern for constitu-
tional safeguards of individuals (including children), helped to
increase our concern about what we are doing with and for
23. N.J. Div. OF ComEcrIoN AND PAROLE, MONTHLY REPORT (Nov. 1967).
24. Letter from Glenn J. Walker, Superintendent, New Mexico Boys School,
Springer, N.M., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 13, 1967.
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the children who come to the attention of the Family Court.
One outcome of the increase in procedural safeguards has been
a greater thoughtfulness on the part of the courts in dealing
with the cases which come before them. This thoughtfulness,
in turn, has made an impact on [New York training schooIs'
intake] .2
Also, New York has ceased to transfer training school youths over sixteen
to institutions under Department of Corrections jurisdiction. This appears
to be the result of continuing concern about the constitutional rights of
individuals.
Finally, Pennsylvania State Bureau Director Catalino says,
[i]n the City of Philadelphia a strange phenomenon has
occurred in that many of the boys who come before the court
are immediately sent home for later hearings, and a majority
of these seem to be making it reasonably well. However, this
is merely conjecture, since it is reasonable to assume that
these same boys may commit further offenses which may or
may not be known to the police."6
One wonders about the future. Of course, there have always been
those who would prefer to take the hard, legal line in dealing with
children. One cannot help but wonder if Gault will strengthen their
resolve. It is of interest that "[f]ollowing[Miami Police Chief]Headley's
lead, Juvenile Court Judge Donald Stone called his own news con-
ference . . . [12/28/67] and said he would become the first judge in
Florida to 'take off the kid gloves' in dealing with juvenile offenders. All
youngsters, suspected of felonies will be fingerprinted and mugged and
the files turned over to law enforcement agencies. '27 It is one thing to
have committed a felony; it is another thing to have been suspected of
committing a felony. Hasty and arbitrary action in the later instance
can be a mischief.
A number of training school superintendents have also conjectured
about possible future effects of Gault. There appears to be a consensus
that Gault will have far-reaching implications throughout the years
ahead. As Superintendent Ziren of New York says, ". . there is a feeling
that we had better be sure of the facts before we make decisions."28
Careless, slipshod, hasty and arbitrary acts will, more and more, invite
25. Letter from Benjamin J. Hill, supra note 8.
26. Letter from Anthony Catalino, Director, Bureau of Youth Development
Institutions, Harrisburg, Pa., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 6, 1967.
27. The Oregonian, Dec. 31, 1967, at 6.
28. Letter from Sidney Zirin, Superintendent, Tryon School for Boys, Johnstown,
N.Y., to Amos E. Reed, Nov. 29, 1967.
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restrictive rulings. Somewhat facetiously, Iowa's Superintendent Tra-
visano observes that ". . . another interesting sidelight which could
develop later on when and if jury trials become a part of juvenile court
is whether a boy or girl can have a jury of his peers. It should be quite a
decision to make."29 Oklahoma Superintendent Carmel Bland's analysis
of Gault leads him to conclude that:
1. [c]ertainly, it would seem that the juvenile courts will be
committing less children to state institutions. Either
they will find an alternative or they will release the
children without action.
2. The children actually committed will be more sophisticated
and probably will be more inclined to rely on legal
procedures for release as opposed to change in their
own attitude and problem handling abilities.
3. [I]t might affect some of our internal methods of investi-
gation within the institution.
4. [HI]e would suspect that the adversary system of legal
procedure will be established in the juvenile courts, so that
the guilt or innocence may rest on the skill of the attorney
and while the rights of the child have been protected,
the needs of the child have not been met."0
Another problem "may develop in regard to the handling and disposition
of institutional discipline. Youths are becoming more aware of their
rights and in some cases discipline is considered by them as being harsh
and unjust. Youths may decide to file writs in the courts to contest the
type of discipline that has been rendered and this will affect institutional
operations."'"
Over the years, courts have been very reluctant to interfere with
institution administration for reasons that are obvious to all. Of course, if
institutions are to merit the confidence of courts, they must keep their
houses in order. But it is pointed out that most of the juveniles sent to
training schools have committed acts that could legally justify their
assignment to the state's care and custody. The children's acts are related
to personal and social problems in need of attention. Superintendent
Shumate of the Kansas Industrial School for Girls regrets that ".... the
Supreme Court, when considering the Gault v. Arizona case, considered
only the constitutional rights of the individual involved and not whether
29. Letter from Anthony P. Travisano, supra note 14.
30. Letter from Carmel A. Bland, Superintendent, Helena State School for Boys,
Helena, Okla., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 12, 1967.
31. Letter from Marvin R. Hogan, Acting Superintendent, National Training
School, Wash., D.C., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 1, 1967.
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he was in need of help with what appeared to be emotional problems." 2
New York's Superintendent Hill agrees that "children's rights are
important and should be protected" but is "concerned over the possible
implication that treatment of the problems of certain children are tied in
with criminal procedure." He points out that
[m]any of us have been fighting against this type of thinking
and working to promote the welfare of children. The mental,
emotional, and social health of our children should be our major
concern. Lack of health in any of these areas calls for remedia-
tion. Unfortunately, the increased attention to procedural fair-
ness may make it difficult for some children to get the help
which they need. On the other hand, it may force the com-
munities to develop new resources and strengths and expand
existing ones so that children may be properly cared for and
the family preserved.33
Reports from Kentucky are that there is a backlog of untreated
children. Correspondents from Kentucky feel that many children who
needed the state's services did not get them because the court placed them
on probation where no actual supervision was given. If Gault increases
this type of disposition, the children of the nation will undoubtedly be the
losers. As a society, we will be doing a disservice to both the children and
the general community. According to a report given by Congressman
Roman C. Pucinski, there are now 48,500 youngsters in state training
schools throughout the United States and that many thousands more are
in need of help."' While training schools are expensive and imperfect,
the services they provide are very essential. Only when families and
local communities better meet their obligations to children can there be a
reduced reliance upon training schools. 5
We must be very careful not to return children and youth to the
"equal" status with adults whose cases are sometimes backlogged on the
dockets for years, whose lawyers sometimes have only met them at the
time of trial, whose constitutional and human rights are repeatedly
ignored in disgraceful county and city jails, etc. This kind of "equality"
must be prevented. But we must also be careful not to be stampeded into
believing that Gault leaves none of the benefits of the juvenile court
process. The Court's opinion emphatically states:
32. Letter from Dennis J. Shumate, Superintetdent, Girls Indus. School, Beloit,
Kan., to Amos E. Reed, Dec. 1, 1967.
33. Letter from Benjamin J. Hill, supra note 8.
34. Pucinski, Catching Up with Jicvenile Delinquecy, Am. J. CoaarcTxoN 5 (Nov.-
Dec. 1967).
35. Id.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
-[w]e do not in this opinion consider the impact of these con-
stitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the
juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire
process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are
not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights
applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or disposi-
tional process.8"
The Court further states:
[t]he National Crime Commission Report recommends that
"Juvenile courts should make fullest feasible use of the pre-
liminary conferences to dispose of cases short of adjudication."
since this "consent decree" procedure would involve neither
adjudication of delinquency nor institutionalization, nothing we
say in this opinion should be construed as expressing any views
with respect to such procedure. The problems of pre-adjudica-
tion treatment of juveniles, and post-adjudication disposition,
are unique to the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this
opinion with regard to the procedural requirements of the ad-
judicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of
the juvenile process."r
It appears very plain, indeed, that Mr. Justice Fortas is recogniz-
ing that juveniles have special needs and that the juvenile court
process is "unique." He emphasizes that "the observance of due
process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will
not compel the States to abandon or to displace any of the sub-
stantive benefits of the juvenile process."" Mr. Justice Fortas then
states that "[w]e do not mean by this [reference to recidivism] to
denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not
aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable.
But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted
are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestica-
tion." 8
Training schools and courts must effect respect and cooperation
between professional agency staffs and attorneys in order to preserve the
individualization of treatment without sacrificing or ignoring basic con-
stitutional rights. We cannot continue to neatly compartmentalize and
36. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
37. Id. at 31 n. 48.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 22.
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fragment our services. We can and must have consistency and flexibility.
The Gault decision should not deter us from this resolve. As the National
Crime Commission Report carefully counsels,
[t] he formal juvenile system should concentrate on those cases
in which a need for coercive court authority has been demon-
strated. Proceedings in these more serious cases must be
characterized by safeguards commonly accepted as necessary
to protect persons subject to coercive state authority, including
counsel, confrontation of complainants, and exclusion of impro-
per evidence. At all stages in the juvenile justice system, there
is need for greater clarification and regularization in the exercise
of discretion.4"
It is evident that this philosophy has very strongly influenced the Gault
decision. Some discretion is necessary since significant life actions and
decisions do not lend themselves to neat cataloguing, but, of course, this
discretion must not be unlimited or capricious.
It now seems that the die is cast and the issues joined. If training
schools do not wish to invite restrictive judicial rulings, they must
exercise the greatest care in their treatment of children. Since families and
the general community are imperfect and since individual children have
imperfections, it seems reasonable that special courts and training schools
will continue to be called upon to help those children whose needs are
exceptional. In providing this care and control, no license is given to
ignore basic rights-nor should such license be given.
I believe that Gault can focus legal and agency attention upon those
in greatest need. Expectations and goals may be delineated, treatments
programmed, and results evaluated so that the greatest positive changes
may be effected. Gault must stand the test of time. The fairness of that
test rests upon the integrity, intelligence, and maturity of those responsible
for its implementation. The training schools throughout the country will,
it is felt, act responsibly in concert with the juvenile courts and other
agencies and individuals involved in the process. My position is very close
to that of Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part
with Gault, who approves of a due process that insures basic fairness and
material for review but is not so restrictive that a major challenge is made
to efforts to meet the needs of children in specially designed courts.4 1
This position also allows for non-criminal procedure as it pertains to
pre-adjudicatory actions. These actions would receive Supreme Court
40. PREsmENT's CommissION ON LAW ExNFORcEmENT, supra note 5, at 293.
41. 387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967) (Harlan's separate opinion).
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restrictive rulings only if challenges were made on specifics that clearly
merit such rulings.
If training school staffs and others dealing with children do not
panic as a result of Gault, I feel that training schools may more effectively
fulfill the roles assigned to them. Of course, if will be a long, long, time
before local communities are in a position to provide the special services
required to meet the challenge presented by children and youth in need
of treatment and control-the children's needs persist and multiply in
spite of Gault. I am personally convinced that the Supreme Court would
not deny the children access to treatment and control and sacrifice them
on a legal altar of disinterest and unconcern. On the contrary, Gault'
should define limits while encouraging the states' concern for children.
